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Brazil has rarely had it so bad. The country’s economy has 
collapsed: since 2013, its unemployment rate has nearly doubled, 
to more than 11 percent, and last year its GDP shrank by 3.8 
percent, the largest contraction in a quarter century. Petrobras, 
Brazil’s semi-public oil giant, has lost 85 percent of its value 
since 2008 thanks to declining commodity prices and its role in 
a massive corruption scandal. The Zika virus has infected 
thousands of Brazilians, exposing the frailty of the country’s 
health system. And despite the billions of reais Brasília poured 
into the 2014 World Cup and this year’s Olympic games, those 
events have done little to improve the national mood or to leave 
a legacy (Rio de Janeiro Mayor Eduardo Paes called the games “A 
missed opportunity for Brazil”). Especially since so many of the 
country’s longstanding problems have proved stubbornly 
persistent: half of all Brazilians still lack access to basic 
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sanitation, 35 million of them lack access to clean water, and 
in 2014, the country suffered 59,600 gun-related deaths — more 
than Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria combined. 
 But Brazil’s biggest problems today are political. Things 
first came to a boil in the summer of 2013, when the police 
repressed a group of students protesting bus and subway fare 
hikes in São Paulo. Within days, some 1.5 million people took to 
the streets of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brazil’s other big 
cities to protest over a much wider set of woes, including the 
government’s wasteful spending (to the tune of some $3.6 
billion) on the construction and refurbishment of a dozen 
stadiums for the World Cup. Starting then, each time Brazilian 
President Dilma Rousseff appeared on television to soothe the 
unrest, Brazilians across the country drowned out her voice by 
rattling pots and pans from their balconies. In 2014, after 
promising to increase public spending and bring down 
unemployment, Rousseff managed to win reelection by a thin 
margin. But she quickly backtracked on her major pledges, 
announcing a plan to cut state spending and rein in inflation. 
The public’s anger mounted. 
 The real death-blow to Rousseff’s government came from 
another source, however: a corruption investigation that had 
been brewing even as she campaigned for reelection. In March 
2014, Brazilian prosecutors exposed a scheme under which 
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business leaders and government officials had been colluding to 
generate kickbacks worth some $2.8 billion since 2004 —the 
single largest corruption scandal ever, anywhere. Operation Car 
Wash, as the investigation came to be known, found that private 
companies had been sending politicians cash through 
intermediaries at Petrobras in exchange for juicy contracts with 
the oil giant—the board of which Rousseff had led before 
becoming president. As new revelations involving high-ranking 
officials hit the Brazilian media over the course of 2015, 
Rousseff’s reputation suffered irreparable damage; in August of 
that year, her approval rating sank to eight percent—a 
historical low. Even Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Rousseff’s once 
wildly popular predecessor, was drawn into the vortex: in March 
2016, prosecutors started investigations against him for owning 
an undeclared property in the beachside city of Guarujá built by 
a construction firm implicated in the Petrobras scheme —among 
other offenses.  
 In May, as the congressional coalition led by Rousseff’s 
Workers’ Party crumbled, legislators voted to suspend her from 
office and began impeachment proceedings on the charge that 
she’d manipulated the budget to hide a gaping deficit. (No one 
has suggested that she personally profited from the graft at 
Petrobras.) Her vice president, Michel Temer—a savvy operator 
who’d cut his teeth in the Chamber of Deputies (the 
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legislature’s lower house)—took over as acting president despite 
the fact that he too was the target of an investigation. Just 
one week before he stepped in on May 12, Eduardo Cunha, a 
lawmaker in Temer’s Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), 
was removed from office as the speaker of the Chamber of 
Deputies on charges of obstructing justice, lying to prosecutors, 
and hiding millions of dollars in a Swiss bank account. Temer 
soon lost three other close associates to Operation Car Wash and 
might face charges as the investigation of his own party’s 
operatives moves forward in coming months.  
All these revelations seem to suggest that Brazil’s current 
crisis is the product of widespread criminal behavior by its 
leading politicians. But the real source of the trouble goes 
deeper. The chaos roiling the country is not the product of 
individual malfeasance, but of flawed political engineering. At 
the heart of Brazil’s problems with corruption and inefficiency 
lie the rules that govern the relationship between the country’s 
executive and legislative branches, which encourage exactly the 
kind of graft that the Petrobras scandal has revealed. To return 
their country to political solvency, Brazilians therefore have a 
might task ahead of them: they must make sweeping electoral and 
political reforms that eliminate the incentives that lead so 
many officials to break the law in the first place.  
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[SUBHEAD] 
In presidential systems, clashes between the chief executive and 
the legislature are common currency. In the United States this 
conflict may take the form of gridlock. Brazil’s 1988 
constitution prevents gridlock by granting the president 
extraordinary powers. Brazilian presidents can issue provisional 
legislation by decree (although all laws must ultimately be 
approved by congress at a later date), dislodge pending 
legislation from congressional committees, force congress to 
vote on urgent measures, and line-item veto bills. Those powers 
have long helped Brazil’s presidents avoid deadlocks and pass 
many needed reforms. But it would be a mistake to assume the 
Brazilian president is all-powerful. On the contrary, holders of 
the presidential office are relatively weak, in the sense that 
they are hostages to unruly, undisciplined coalitions and the 
agendas of local politicians. Brazilian presidents may be able 
to avoid gridlock altogether, but they are minority presidents. 
 Here is the catch. Because Brazil’s Congress has more than 
two dozen political parties, it’s nearly impossible for a single 
one to ever win a majority. Brazil’s presidents must therefore 
form coalitions in order to govern effectively. And that’s where 
the problems really start. Because parties have no strong 
ideological agendas-but are rather loosely-knit coalitions of 
local bosses who have no qualms about forming or dissolving 
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coalitions any time, presidents must strike personal deals with 
small groups of legislators every time a major bill comes to the 
floor. Members of Congress constantly renegotiate their 
political loyalties—and they do so based not on nation-wide 
commitments to good governance but on the parochial interests of 
the constituencies they represent.  
 Making matters worse, Brazil’s electoral rules allow 
candidates to switch parties at low cost, undermining any chance 
of ideological coherence within coalitions. Also, candidates are 
elected to Congress based not on the number of votes they 
receive individually, but on the total number their party pulls 
in. This creates an incentive for politicians to change 
allegiances on a regular basis: jumping ship for a party led by 
a popular candidate can often boost less popular aspirants to 
office (or keep them there). Brazilian politicians thus tend to 
ride on the coattails of powerful allies instead of focusing on 
party loyalty, ideological consistency, and the mastering of 
policy details. All of which makes it hard for most voters to 
know what ideas individual candidates—or parties—stand for. As a 
result, Brazilians tend to pick their leaders based on their 
personal appeal rather than on commitment to a party program or 
the quality of policy proposals.  
 These problems are all intensified by the fact that, once 
Brazilian lawmakers take office, few rules bind them to their 
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parties. Not only can they switch parties, as mentioned above: 
legislators can also vote as they wish, and go as far as voting 
against their own parties or the presidential administration 
their parties ostensibly support. When they do break ranks, they 
normally get away with it. It is rare to find a congressperson 
who gets booted out of the party or a party that gets cut off 
the coalition for voting contrary to the party whip’s 
recommendations. Since party whips can’t control their own 
congressmen, presidents must bargain with legislators on an 
individual basis in order to pass legislation. The need to win 
over so many individual allies—with their own interests and 
constituencies to please—has led Brazilian presidents to pump 
vast amounts of pork, patronage, and protection into the system.  
 In many democracies, of course, logrolling is neither rare 
nor necessarily bad. But in Brazil, the practice has proved 
deeply counterproductive. For one thing, it has led to 
inefficient government spending. In 2015 tax revenues accounted 
for some 35% of Brazil's GDP—more than they do in a number of 
wealthier nations, including South Korea and Switzerland. Yet 
despite this income, the country’s public goods are in dire 
shape. Take education: in an assessment of 65 countries 
completed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development in 2012 (the most recent year for which such data 
are available), Brazilian high school students ranked near the 
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bottom in mathematics and reading—below their peers in Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, and Thailand. Or consider infrastructure: since 
investing in expensive public goods is seldom a good strategy to 
win votes, the Brazilian government tends to favor investing in 
roads designed for private cars over spending money on public 
transportation. As a result, Rio de Janeiro, a metropolis of 12 
million people, has fewer miles of subway track than Lisbon, 
which is home to just 530,000. Meanwhile, government has 
provided tax subsidies for well-connected families to hire local 
musicians to play at their weddings in the name of promoting 
‘national culture’. Former presidential candidate Aécio Neves 
invested 14 million reais when he was governor of Minas Gerais 
in building a landing strip that happened to be located in one 
of his uncle’s farms. And the press has reported several roads 
and bridges that seem to connect nowhere to nowhere: a common 
practice whereby politicians and contractors coalesce in 
promoting useless projects paid for by the public purse for 
their own financial benefit.  
 Such inefficiencies stem directly from Brazil’s 
dysfunctional political process. Legislators and the president 
alike regularly raise taxes not so that they can invest in 
better public services, but so that they can replenish the war 
chests they use to please the special interest groups that help 
them stay in power. With government spending benefiting thin 
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slices of the electorate rather than the majority of Brazilians, 
the discrepancy between revenue and the quality and spread of 
public services is enormous. To be sure, many other countries 
are home to tugs of war between narrow interests and the public 
good, but because Brazilian electoral rules are so beneficial to 
the former rather than the latter, the situation is particularly 
egregious. 
 And yet, bad as they are, public policy inefficiencies pale 
in comparison to the other big problem engendered by Brazil’s 
flawed rules of the game: endemic corruption. In many cases, 
pork and patronage prove insufficient to win Congress’s support; 
presidents therefore often sweeten the pot by allowing 
legislators to appoint their allies to jobs in Brazil’s powerful 
state-owned companies and regulatory agencies. Once in these 
posts, the new officials gain a say over what companies will 
receive lucrative government contracts. And many of them have 
proven all too happy to make those decision based on bribes, 
which they then share with their patrons in congress.  
 Operation Car Wash has exposed just how widespread this 
kind of corruption has become. According to prosecutors, 
numerous Petrobras executives were political cronies who saw 
their main job as charging illegal fees on deals with private-
sector contractors—and then channeling those fees to their 
backers in government (after pocketing a portion for themselves). 
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As for the contractors in question, they included many of 
Brazil’s mightiest corporations, including construction giant 
Odebrecht and multinational conglomerate Andrade Gutierrez. 
Estimates suggest that since 1997 these companies secured 
subsidized credit by Brazil’s National Development Bank at the 
tune of $20 billion, at the cost of the taxpayer. To ensure 
continued access to this gold mine, the companies in question 
lavished gifts and other favors on cooperative politicians and 
contributed large sums, both on and off the books, to their 
reelection campaigns. Corruption was the rule, and Congress had 
strong incentives to ensure that public spending remained high 
and poorly regulated. 
 
[SUBHEAD] 
The state of Brazilian politics has not always seemed so bleak. 
From 1995 to 2010, two social democratic presidents, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, managed to cut 
inflation, grow the economy, and lift millions of people out of 
poverty. But they never set out to fundamentally change the 
rules of the game, even if they did bring about a good deal of 
reform. Rather than tackling the system’s structural problems, 
they cleverly worked around them, enacting policies that 
benefitted most Brazilians while allowing the wheels of the 
patronage system to turn undisturbed. For a while, this worked 
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well for most Brazilians, since both Lula and Cardoso were 
careful to insulate their pet economic and social policies from 
pressure from interest groups and their representatives in 
Congress. Unlike congresspersons and local bosses, presidents’ 
large and diverse national constituencies make them less 
enthusiastic about distributing particularistic benefits and 
more inclined to favor public goods. 
 In order to deal with Brazil’s corrupt and inefficient 
National Health System, for example, Cardoso expanded a parallel 
Family Health Strategy, sending doctors into poor neighborhoods 
to provide preventive care and reduce pressure on Brazil’s 
public hospitals. For his part, Lula launched Bolsa Família, a 
conditional cash-transfer program that cut poverty in Brazil by 
28 percent and cost a mere 0.8 percent of the country’s GDP. The 
program was so cheap, and its benefits so obvious, that it 
eventually won widespread public support—even from Brazil's 
conservatives, who initially opposed it. Both Cardoso and Lula 
also protected Brazil's Central Bank and Finance Ministry from 
political pressure by imposing an informal presidential shield 
on these institutions, giving them a free hand to pursue 
policies that helped the economy stabilize and then grow.  
 Cardoso and Lula weathered their fair share of corruption 
scandals as well, but their public-oriented policies and the 
strong economic growth the country enjoyed under their tenures 
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convinced voters to look the other way. At their peak they were 
popular enough that lawmakers found it hard to openly oppose 
them to extract fat concessions in exchange for their support. 
But Lula and Cardoso could get away with it in part because the 
quality of social policy at the time was at such a low starting 
base. There was a lot of low-hanging fruit to be picked, and 
both leaders could bring about major improvements by making 
relatively small changes to the existing system. As things 
improved and Brazilians became more demanding of their 
politicians, theirs was a tough act to follow—as Rousseff 
learned the hard way when she became president in 2010.  
Having never held elected office before, Rousseff had a 
hard time navigating the give and take of Brazilian coalition 
building. She also had to weather the difficult aftermath of the 
global financial crisis and preside over an economy that was 
shrinking, due in part to falling commodity prices. Wedded to 
mercantilist and interventionist economic theories, Rousseff 
tried to stimulate Brazil’s sagging economy by increasing public 
spending. This turned out to be a bad bet, since it encouraged 
members of Congress to chase more pork and kickbacks as 
government intervention in the economy grew. The combustible mix 
of rising unemployment and growing scandal that resulted would 
eventually seal her fate.  
 
 13 
[SUBHEAD] 
Unlikely as it may seem, Brazil’s current troubles might just 
contain a silver lining: business as usual has become so costly 
that many Brazilians understand that the system has to change. 
Operation Car Wash has laid bare the misdeeds of the country's 
political class, and for the first time ever, dozens of 
Brazilian politicians and business leaders have gone to jail. In 
the past, Brazilian politicians were able to shrug off 
corruption investigations by appealing to a lenient justice 
system, a weak congressional ethics committee, and a public that 
seemed inured to graft. That has now changed. The judges, 
investigators, and prosecutors running Operation Car Wash are a 
young generation of civil servants who are using a new set of 
tactics and rules, including the threat of serious sentences and 
leniency deals, to break the silence that Brazilian politicians 
and businesspeople have maintained for decades. Just as 
important, according to polling service Datafolha ordinary 
Brazilians now believe corruption is the top national problem 
affecting their country, and have begun taking to the streets to 
force their leaders to listen. While social protest up to 2014 
was mostly about irrational government spending rather than 
corruption, the Car Wash operation seems to be influencing 
public attitudes. In the run-up to the vote in Congress that 
opened impeachment procedures against Rousseff last May, for 
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example, weekly protests developed the distinctive anti-
corruption tone that they had lacked before.  
 For all his shortcomings, President Temer seems to 
understand the need for change. He is pushing for Brazil’s 
first-ever cap on public spending, a measure that would limit 
expenses to current levels for the next 20 years, thereby 
forcing contending interest groups to compete for a fixed amount 
of resources instead of just pushing for more tax hikes or 
larger deficits. He has also introduced measures that will allow 
government to reward efficient bureaucrats across the vast 
expanse of the Brazilian state. And crucially, he is talking 
about Constitutional reform to reduce the number of political 
parties in Brazil and restrict their ability to merge their 
electoral lists, measures that might reduce the cost of doing 
business in Brazilian politics. 
 Getting Brazil back on track, however, will take even more 
sweeping reforms. In short, lawmakers must radically rewrite the 
rules of the game so that elected officials stop working only 
for their backers and start focusing on good governance for the 
majority of the people. Brazilian academics, policymakers and 
pundits have offered a number of ideas on how they might do so. 
One radical proposal would have Brazil drop its presidential 
system in favor of a parliamentary one akin to the United 
Kingdom’s. By fusing Parliament and the Executive, this would 
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make legislators directly responsible for the success or failure 
of the government—and since legislators would have to consider 
the possibility of having to face the electorate again if they 
challenge the government’s major decisions, this reform might 
reduce the opportunities for graft and encourage the development 
of stronger political parties. Other politicians have argued for 
a semi-presidential system similar to those of France and 
Portugal, in which a prime minister accountable to the 
legislature conducts day-to-day politics and a president retains 
the power to dissolve parliament and call for elections. 
Shifting to such a system could in theory also work to make 
lawmakers more accountable to the people for the results of 
policy decisions, while still retaining the figure of the 
president as a national leader. Yet another proposal would keep 
Brazil’s current presidential system as it is, but reduce the 
number of existing parties to six to eight, and push them to 
commit to coherent policy platforms by changing the country’s 
arcane electoral rules.  
 Whichever proposal succeeds in the end, and it is early 
days to know, Brazil sorely needs to reduce the number of 
parties in Congress while also empowering them to discipline 
their own lawmakers in the name of a coherent party platform. As 
long as managing the governing coalition looks like herding cats, 
the system will remain dysfunctional. The Car Wash investigation, 
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Rousseff’s demise, and economic collapse have opened an 
opportunity for Brazil to reform the rules of the game in ways 
that ensure better governance for its people. Whether the 
political class will be willing and able to implement the 
necessary reforms will largely depend on them sensing that 
business as usual will no longer do.   
 
  
 
 
